Europejski Przegląd Prawa i Stosunków Międzynarodowych

EUROPEJSKA
WYŻSZA SZKOŁA
PRAWA I ADMINISTRACJI

EUROPEJSKI PRZEGLĄD PRAWA I STOSUNKÓW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH

Od Redakcji

W obecnym numerze naszego kwartalnika ze szczególnym uznaniem odnotowujemy blok referatów przedstawionych na odbytej w czerwcu br. konferencji Studenckiego Koła Naukowego Prawa Międzynarodowego EWSPA na temat „Bezpieczeństwo w Europie w świetle prawa międzynarodowego", w której uczestniczyli także pracownicy Akademii Obrony Narodowej. Teraz zamieszczamy trzy artykuły podejmujące problematykę terroryzmu, pozostałe zaś teksty powstałe w związku z tą konferencją znajdą się w następnym numerze.

Do grona zagranicznych autorów dołączyła profesor Lidija Čehulić Vukadinović z Uniwersytetu w Zagrzebiu. Jej artykuł stanowi rozszerzoną wersję referatu przedstawionego na konferencji Central European Political Science Association, która odbyła się w Wilnie (25 i 26 września br.).

Spis treści

Recenzje

Lidija Čehulić
Vukadinović[1]

NATO beyond 2014: why open--door policy still matters? Western Balkans between Euro--Atlantic integration and Russia

Due to the Ukrainian crisis, some new internal development in Croatia and migrant crisis, which has recently started to affect majority of the Western Balkans countries, as well as NATO and European Union, the enlargement of NATO to the rest of the Western Balkans countries is not any more a main foreign policy goal, neither in Croatia nor in the rest of the international community. As a member of both, NATO and European Union, Croatia is a part of so-called Western democratic, developed world. But all instabilities and threats from the area of the Western Balkans countries, where the unstable stability still prevails, very easy and quickly can be spread to the West. Of all other foreign actors who are present today in the Western Balkans (Russia, Turkey, China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar...), only enlargement of NATO could enhance the democracy in that region. In the time of reseting overall Russia-West relations, the policy of NATO's hesitation towards the Western Balkans can create a new space for the stronger Russia's influence in that still turbulent part of Europe.

Key words: Enlargement of NATO, Western Balkans, Russia, Croatia, Euro-Atlantism

Introduction

The geostrategic reasons were the dominant ones in the first two rounds of the NATO's post-Cold War enlargement. Membership of the first ten post-socialist European countries (1999 – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland; 2004 – Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slo-

---

[1] Professor at University of Zagreb, Faculty of political sciences and Member of Executive Board of the Atlantic Council of Croatia and Centre for international relations, Zagreb, Croatia, lcehulic@fpzg.hr

vakia, Slovenia) has filled in the geostrategic and geopolitical vacuum in Europe and has thus disabled a stronger penetration of Russia's influence on creation of security, political and economic environment in the post-Cold War Europe (S.R. Sloan, 2010:93-128). By the third wave of enlargement (2009 – Albania, Croatia) NATO has strongly penetrated the Western Balkans region[2]. Since then the enlargement policy has been dropping down on the list of priorities within internal NATO policies. In adapting itself to international situation and global security challenges (D.S. Yost, 1998; R.R. Moore, 2007; W.J. Thies, 2009) NATO is nowadays increasingly insisting on various forms of partnership (instead of full membership). The remaining countries in the region of Western Balkans (except Croatia and Albania), in spite of existing institutional ties with NATO (L. Čehulić Vukadinović, 2014) have not received an invitation for full membership in this most powerful military-political organization so far.

However, the latest crisis in and around Ukraine has drawn NATO's interest back to its traditional area of engagement – Europe – and has strengthened Euro-Atlantic relations, including the stronger engagement of American forces in European territories (J. Dempsey, 2014). Within such new circumstances Croatia, which has entered NATO not only as a post-socialist, but also as the first post-conflict country and after fulfilling a range of specific additional criteria connected exactly with armed conflicts and instabilities in the Western

Balkans area should strongly advocates for integration of the Western Balkans countries into NATO. Today the Western Balkans needs NATO much more than is the case other way around. Having in mind the fact that an initiative for membership status must come from a candidate country, the Western Balkans countries should use this momentum when NATO's focus is again shifting back to Europe to point to some new geostrategic factors, on top of geopolitical ones (democratization and political stabilization of the region), such as Russia's presence in the region (D. Petrović, 2010:223-240) determination of new energy transport corridors (G. Stang, 2015), growth of Islamic fundamentalism, Serbia's desire for neutrality, piracy and trafficking in the Mediterranean, rise in illegal migrations, and challenges and instabilities arising in a wider Mediterranean region) which might and should be taken into consideration in advocating for a next round of enlargement of the Alliance. Besides this, in the Western Balkans there are countries today that are not only voicing concrete interest for membership, but are also institutionally closest to becoming a full-fledged member (Montenegro, Macedonia)

Why does Western Balkans need NATO?

Bloody disintegration of former Yugoslavia (J. Simić, 2010) has slowed down the much needed post-socialistic transition of countries emerging after the fall apart of the former Yugoslavia. All of them put the integration to NATO as their main foreign policy goal. But the wars in territories of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

---

[2] The term „Western Balkans" is a political term adopted during the EU Summit in Zagreb in 2000. Countries to which this term refers to today are the following: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania.

(1991–1995) and NATO's bombing SR Yugoslavia (1999) have slowed and determined their paths to integration into NATO. Presence of international forces in the territory of Macedonia was preventing bloody ethnic conflicts in that country (M. Fetai, 2007). The only exception was Slovenia which became a NATO member in April 2004[3]. Today, in spite of the still present and used term Western Balkans, each of these countries has different level of institutional links with NATO.

Croatia become a full-fledged member of NATO in 2009. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country that suffered the longest and bloodiest war after the break-up of former Yugoslavia, was accepted to NATO's Partnership for Peace program in 2006, and conditionally offered participation in the Action Plan for NATO membership in 2010. However, the underlying issue of military property remains unsolved. But with the protectorate status upon Bosnia and Herzegovina and a political system that very few of the citizens of this country supports – the Dayton Agreement and emergence of a "state within the state" – the Republic of Srpska (R. Nešković, 2013), faster further integration of this country into NATO is more of a symbolic character than realistic possibilities (R. Maxwell, J.A. Olsen, 2013)

Serbia desires to separate the Euro-Atlantic process and to stay outside of NATO – i.e. to remain military neutral – while still aspiring for EU membership (A. Savić 2010). Serbia is still viewing NATO as an enemy that has attacked Serbian sovereignty in 1999 (action in Kosovo followed by NATO air strikes on strategically significant targets in Belgrade and Novi Sad). Despite of this, Serbia has been a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme since December 2006. Democratic, institutional, and defence reforms are a key focus of cooperation. While not an aspirant for membership of the Alliance, the country is deepening cooperation with NATO through an Individual Partnership Action Plan agreed in January 2015. But it is clear that without the democratization of the whole Serbian society and forming of a stable pro-Western government there will be no further integration of Serbia into NATO.

Montenegro has gained its independence in 2006, and has immediately made a solid start in implementing reforms needed for accession to NATO (M. Tahirović, 2010:222-276). NATO recognized this and admitted Montenegro into Partnership for Peace immediately after the independence (2006). This was a clear advantage for Montenegrin armed forces, as well as for the whole society. Later Montenegro feld as collateral victim of NATO politics when due to conflicts in Georgia it was not admitted to Membership Action Plan. Montenegro had to wait until 2009 to enter this program. Again, as a collateral victim of NATO's internal crisis it was not admitted to NATO membership during the Chicago summit, and because of the crisis in Ukraine, again, not admitted during the summit in Wales, Montenegro now must wait for the fourth wave of NATO enlargement, if and when, NATO is going to open its door to new membership.

---

[3] Slovenia was the most advanced federal state within the former Yugoslavia; it was spared large scale war destruction, and being a small but well organized country it managed to implement the needed reforms quickly and successfully (M. Prokopijević, 2005, pp. 373-382).

Kosovo as an independent state is the project of the United States of America (R. Vukadinović, 2008). In both organizations, NATO and EU, potential membership of Kosovo is not being officially mentioned for the time being, for it is waiting for all members of this organizations to recognize the newly independent state. Still, there are ways in which NATO members are cooperating with Kosovo, not to mention the fact that EU, NATO and UN forces are physically present in Kosovo. Based on this it might be said that Kosovo is in a rather specific situation, because it is simultaneously a subject, and an object of contemporary international relations. Last year the EU has offered to Kosovo the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. It was the first time that European Union has established the institutional tie with one Western Balkans country before NATO accepted it in its programe Partnership for peace. But till now there is no sign that NATO is going to offer Kosovo Partnership for peace programe in the near future.

Albania joined the NATO in 2009. It was certainly a reward, but also an obligation for Albanian government to start addressing Albanian internal problems (mostly connected to soft security challenges such as drug trafficking, crime, corruption, unemployment) with more firmness and commitment (Y. Zyla; 2011).

Macedonia was very disappointed when NATO has not invited it to join the Alliance together with Albania nad Croatia in 2009. Concerning post-socialistic reforms it has done a lot but NATO's and EU's policy of constantly postponing integration of this country into this two western organizations definitely has damaged Macedonian internal development. Religious and territorial problems gradually followed ethnic ones. More and more Albanian population is showing its dissatisfaction with its status in the new state (M. Mitrevska, 2013). The Ohrid Agreement has legally regulated status of unsatisfied national minorities but its implementation was facing numerous problems of objective and subjective nature. Internal instabilities that can easily spread over Macedonian borders in combination with Greek–Macedonian dispute over the name of the new state (among other) resulted in a strong orientation of Skopje towards the West, inclusive of NATO and its strongest member, the USA. In spite of Macedonian active cooperation with NATO within the Partnership for Peace and Membership Action Plan, disappointment after the NATO Bucharest summit has resulted in slow down of implementation of necessary reforms in Macedonia. At the same time its accession to European Union is also in a stall-mate (T. Xhaferi, 2015). In the long run this *status quo* that NATO is maintaining towards this country can't be good, neither for Macedonia, nor for Western Balkans. It will be very difficult for Macedonia to resist internal pressures without external assistance.

> Despite all problems the Western Balkans states have faced in their internal development what they want to achieve is the faster progress toward modern developed Western world and a rapid increase in living standards. But all of them are underdeveloped in comparison with Western standards. Their development is slow and difficult, it involves major social, political and economic changes The recent global economic crisis additionally has slown down their reforms. The

relations between economically advanced and the developing parts, the rich and the poor, the haves and have-nots have became one of the main problems of the people's everyday life in the area of Western Balkans. So the europaization of the region (enlargement of NATO and EU) is seen not only as a guarantee for the peace and stability but as a framework for further development and democratization of the whole region.

In the past the area of Western Balkans was very important for overall NATO's post-bipolar transition. Until the Ukrainian crisis (spring 2014) Western Balkans was the only part of Europe where NATO still had its forces present as guarantors of peace and stability (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo). In the area of Western Balkans (Goražde, Kosovo) NATO took its first out-of-area operations in post-bipolar world (S.R. Sloan, 2005:89-127). In the framework of their regional approach the each member of NATO have developed and implemented many programmes especially for the Western Balkans. Today NATO has its external border (Croatia, Albania) in that area and, due to the new threats coming from and through the Western Balkans, can strenghten overall security in the transatlantic area.

The policy of enlargement was one of the most successful internal post-bipolar policy of NATO and the South East Europe. Wester Balkans was part of it (Slovenia, Croatia, Albania). Due to the Ukrainian crisis it is more likely that the countries of that part of Europe, not from the European East (Georgia, Ukraina, Belarus, Moldova) can join the NATO. The open door policy or enlargement remains as official policy of NATO, but there will be no new admissions to NATO for quite some time. The last NATO summit in Wales was not, and probably the future one in Warsaw, is not going to be the so-called enlargement summit. In the region where *unstable stability* still prevails (R. Vukadinović, 2002) and even some new challenges to security are present (border disputes, ethnic rivalities, voice of radical Islam, lack of energy supply, illegal migrations, corruption, high unemployment rate of young, well-educated populations, general economic stagnation) the integration of the Western Balkans in the whole, free and democratic Europe is very much needed.

NATO, Russia and other foreign actors in the Western Balkans

In contemporary European and international order Western Balkans is again an important region, not only due to its own problems and unsolved issues, but because of the todays new strategic, geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons. In early 1990s of the last century when post-bipolar structures of the international community started to emerge Western Balkans was primarily turned to the West (NATO, EU, USA). Today, after twenty five years of transition, conditions for easier penetration of other players into this area were created. Russia and Turkey, together with some other Asian and Arab states (China, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Qatar) are increasingly important partners on which countries of the Western Balkans may count, along with the West.

Since NATO has established institutional relations with Russia, membership in that organization does not have to mean automatic break-up of connections and relations of the Western Balkans countries with Russia. But in the times of frozen relations between the West and Russia NATO can and could, to use its open-door policy and offer to some Western Balkans countries (Montenegro, Macedonia) something that Russia cannot: a membership. In the time of a new Cold War in Europe the West can use that tool for further strenghtening the euroatlantism in that still turbulent part of Europe. And in comparison with Russia, NATO can be seen as a still important, viable and desirable organization in the part of Europe which Russia is more and more approaching. Highlightening its ethno-cultural ties of Slavic brotherhood and Christian Orthodoxy and formaly declaring the region of Western Balkan as of great strategic importance to its foreign policy (J. Bugajski, 2004:169-202). Putin's Russia nowadays is strongly approaching that region. Serbia, Republic of Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are seen in Moscow as a main potential for Russia's influence (V. Đorđević, 2015) not only in that part of Europe, but to the wider Mediterranean region. With the hesitation of the West and such Russia's ofensive policy toward Western Balkans, especially in energy sector (S. Đukić 2009:139-201) Russia will, for a long time, have a secure playground for implementing its foreign policy goals and chance to slow down the process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration in Europe.

Within efforts on seeking possibilities for profiling new Turkish foreign policy Western Balkans represents an extremely interesting and useful region (A. Muharemi, 2012:215-229), Turkish policy in the Balkans may be viewed as a grand come back and as a desire to, as described by Turkish foreign minister Davatoglu, reconnect Turkey with its historical environment. In concrete moves to that effect Turkey has considerably improved its relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. After the break up of former Yugoslavia and during the bloody wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina Turkey was aware that the West would not allow creation of a Muslim states in the centre of the Western Balkans. So Turkey was a biggest donor and supplier of humanitarian aid, money and arms equipments to Muslim populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As soon as the independence of Macedonia was declared, Turkey offered it security guarrantee. It had signed the military cooperation agreement with Albania. Turkey also participated with its forces in the UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today Turkey is strongly economically present in all Balkan countries, and in foreign relations it acts as an actor that knows the region and wishes to remain present in it. The clash between secular and fundamentalistic version of Islam is one of many conflicts existing in Islamic countries, which can be detected in Turkey as well. Those radical forces have been gaining strength which claim that Turkey does not need Europe and that the Turkish eco-

nomic growth clearly proves their point. The same conflict between the two conceptions, secular and religious, has been transferred to the area of Western Balkans mostly populated with Muslims (Bosnia nad Hercegovina, Sandžak, Kosovo, partly Macedonia) (D. Simeunović, A. Dolnik, 2013). Some other Islamic countries are sending the aid and funds over there. The *mujahideen* were fighting together with the Bosnian Muslims during the war after the break-up of Yugoslavia. Now together with the support of local Muslim populations in Bosnia they organize the camps for recruiting people from the Wester Balkans to fight in Syria, Iraq… Some Western analysts were suggesting many years ago a prompt inclusion of Turkey to the EU in order to prevent strenghtening the radical forces of Islam (F.S. Larrabee, 1994:17-18) but it did not happen.

Some years ago the prospect of NATO membership used to be the spur for reforms in the Western Balkans. Today people are tired of slow europaization of that region and Western Balkans rocky path to democracy (J. Dempsey:2015). The stabilization and integration of the Western Balkans region will continue gradually, with insistence on stronger engagement of local players. But a number of links to the countries, who are members of NATO, have been lost and are currently being replaced by new players, especially on economic fields. Besides investments in different fields coming from Russia and Turkey, China has confirmed its investments in infrastructure of 2.5 bil-

lion euros (rail link Belgrade and Budapest, roads in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro – M. Bieri, 2015, p. 3) in order to have a better approach from Asia (through the Western Balkans) to the central European markets.

The widespread economic difficulties in the Western Balkans have also aggravated frustration over the poor performance of the local political elites. For many hopes of change for better way of life in the Western Balkans have waned. In 2014 there were a huge demonstrations against local political elites and poor socio-economic conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The mass exodus of about 40.000 Kosovars from Kosovo to Europe in January this year was the visible expression of people's resignation. Generaly, the overall security, political and economic help that the NATO members can offer to the Western Balkans countries is still greater than that of Russia, Turkey or China. But there is an open question: are they, and the NATO as a whole, willing to do so?

Concerning faster Montenegro's membership to NATO, NATO General Secretary Stoltenberg has said that for the new membership NATO needs the consensus of all 28 countries. The Anglo-German initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of trying to put that country back on the path to European integration was not followed by a strong message from Brusseles that the Western Balkans matter and that the countries of the region do have a place inside the West. With such policy of its hesitation the West should be worried by Russia's and Turkey's meddling in its backyard. The majority of the EU members consider Turkey not to be a part of Europe, but Turkey is a member of NATO.

The role of Croatia, migrant crisis and prospects for further enlargement of NATO to the Western Balkans

As a member of NATO Croatia should define as its foreign policy goal the further enlargement of NATO to the Western Balkans states and try to find a countries within this organization who are sharing the same ideas. Of all new post-socialistic member states within the NATO Croatia is also the first post-conflict country accepted to the membership. With its negotiating experience Croatia could and should unselfishly assist the countries in the region (L. Čehulić Vukadinović, 2010:166-168). At the same time it should make sure that NATO recognize their efforts and with the further enlargement policy to the region of Western Balkans could spread the euroatlantism in that part of Europe.

But due to some new internal development in Croatia and migrant crisis which has recently started to affect majority of the Western Balkans countries, as well as NATO and European Union, the enlargement of NATO to the rest of the Western Balkans countries is not any more a main foreign policy goal, neither in Croatia nor in the rest of the international community.

> Nowadays Croatian Government headed by Prime Minister Zoran Milanović still has the regional policy, based on strenghtening the relations with its neighbours and another countries in the Western Balkans region, as one of Croatia's main foreign policy goal. That includes an enlargement of both organizations, NATO and European Union, to the rest of the Western Balkans.

But the new elected Madam President of Croatia, Kolinda Grabar Kitarović, is strongly pushing for the new Croatian initiative in foreign policy: the Baltic-Adriatic Initiative (originally *Uspravnica Baltik-Jadran*). Very soon Croatia is going to have a new parliamentary elections and probably the right-wing party Croatian Democratic Union (who strongly supported Madame President during her campaigne because she was a member of that party from its begining) will win. That means that probably we will have a radical shift in Croatian approach toward the Western Balkans region. Minorizing the Western Balkans neighborhood is not a good choice for Croatia. As a member of both, NATO and European Union, and very intensive relations with the United States of America, Croatia is a part of so called Western democratic world. But at the same time Croatia has so many unresolved questions and problems inherited from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia and recent wars (still missing people, return of refugees and issue of private properties, border disputes, prosecution of war crimes...). And all new challenges to security and stability, which are today present in the area of the Western Balkans, very soon are going to affect the Croatian society as well. In the future Croatia should not be the l*eader* or *tutor* of the Western Balkans region but the ***promotor*** of integration of this countries to NATO and European Union which is in Croatian national

interests. Because of all foreign actors who are present in that region today, only NATO and European Union could take care of the further democratization of the societies of the Western Balkans countries. With the policy of enlargement NATO is enhancing the democracy in overall societies of the Western Balkans countries. Without further NATO/EU enlargement majority of these societies will be faced very soon with the so called Macedonian syndrom.

Another factor that is minorizing the further enlargement policy of NATO to the Western Balkans countries is the current migrant crisis which Croatia and some other countries in the South Eastern Europe (Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary) are facing with on daily basis. The migrant crisis is not only the humanitarian issue, but also it is becoming more and more a political, economic and security problem in that still turbulent region of Europe.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that migrant crisis is a big human tragedy, and it requires a very comprehensive response from the whole international community, including NATO[4]. Today all NATO Allies contribute to the solving of the migrant crisis. They do it in different ways. Most of them are members of the European Union too, and they are part of the efforts of the European Union to address this crisis. Some NATO Allies also contribute through the efforts of the United Nations, by supporting the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and in other ways. Concerning the recent migrant crisis, one can see that again there is some kind of division of responsibilities between the European Union and NATO in addressing this human tragedy. As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pointed out, European Union is responsible for so called immediate measures, borders control, migrants routes, hotspots for migrants, the discussion about quotas... (S. Galbert, 2015). That, and all other civilian issues connected with the migrant crisis have to be addressed by the European Union. In addition to that, NATO is now mostly focused on so called long-term efforts: to address the root causes of the migrant crisis in the countries of origin of the refugees. NATO is working with countries in that turbulent regions (Afghanistan, Jordan, Tunisia, Iraq...) to try to help them to increase their capacity and their capability to stabilize their own countries. NATO is trying to project stability without always deploying large numbers of combat troops but by training, advising, helping with reforms, helping with capacity-building... And all NATO Allies, together with other partners, are participating in the coalition fighting ISIL.

NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg adds that, within the migrants crisis, the human trafficking is the main problem. So NATO was welcoming European Union decision to triple funding for the maritime search-and-rescue operation in the Mediterranean, to increase its presence at sea, even considering possible military action (EUNAVFOR Med) against people smugglers[5]. France's Interior Minister Bernard

---

[4] Joint press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Bohuslav Sobotka, July 9, 2015.http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_122475.htm?selectedLocale=en, approached October 2nd 2015.

[5] http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-nato-calls-for-comprehensive-response-to-migrant-crisis-2015-4, approached October 2, 2015.

Cazeneuve, stated that till October 2015, 177 human smuggling networks, involving around 3 300 individuals, has been dismantled in France only, a 25 percent increase over 2014 (S. Galbert, 2015).

> But the migrant crisis creates mixed feelings in the public opinions, as well as in the countries of the Western Balkans. Political forces playing on anti-migrant and far-right sentiment will seek increasingly to benefit from the situation. Thus, during an extraordinary session of the Austrian parliament on migration policy in Vienna, September 1 2015, the leader of Austria's far-right Freedom Party, Heinz-Christian Strache, has blamed the NATO alliance for triggering the refugee crisis that has overwhelmed Europe[6]. Many Russian's opinion makers are seeing the United States of America and NATO policies as a main catalyst of the recent influx of migrants from North Africa, the Middle East and Afghanistan to Europe. They pointed out that NATO for years has pursued a policy of offensive destabilization in the very regions which people are fleeting from (Libya, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan) in their hundreds of thousands. An easier solution, for NATO would be to put an end to its campaign of destabilization in the Middle East and North Africa, but that would require the acceptance and acknowledgement of some very hard truths, conclude some Russian analysts[7].

The large majority of EU member states (most of them are the NATO members) agreed to relocate additional 120.000 refugees (in addition to the 40.000 already agreed) but the EU/NATO members; Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania opposed the obligatory plan. Another EU/NATO members Poland, Latvia showed significant skepticism about the idea of mandatory relocation. Hungary ended the construction of a fence at its border with Serbia, the illegal crossing of which shall now be punished with a three years jail penalty under Hungarian law. Serbia's Minister of foreign affairs complained about the closure of the Hungarian-Serbian border stated that it is nowadays unacceptable and unsustainable decision. And due to this Hungarian act, a ten of thousands of migrants from Serbia immediately have entered the Croatia which was not well prepared.

The migrant crisis has again damaged the relations in the fragile Western Balkans, especially between Croatia and Serbia. After the recent bloody wars the relations have improved over the past fifteen years. The process of reconciliation has started, economic and trade relations were very fast growing, bilateral ministerial visits be-

---

[6] "The USA and NATO have destroyed Iraq and Libya with their military intervention, bombs and missiles; provided financial, logistical and military support to the opposition against President Assad in Syria, and thus made possible the destruction, chaos, suffering and radical Islamism (IS) in the region," Heinz-Christian Strache said. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/05/us-europe-migrants-austria-strache-idUSKCN-0R50HP20150905 approached October 1st, 2015.

[7] „The debate around migration into the EU is happening nearly entirely without reference to the causes of the recent influx of migrants from North Africa and the Middle East. The elephant in the room is NATO and nobody really wants to talk about it." http://russia-insider.com/en/media-coverage-europes-migrant-crisis-ignores-root-cause-nato/ri8228, approached September 3, 2015.

came almost routine, Croatia promised to help Serbia in its own application for EU membership. Now again there is a serious escalation of nationalistic rhetoric on both sides, as a reaction on Hungarian building a wire fence along its borders with Serbia nd Croatia. Croatia was demanding Serbia to stop directing tens of thousands of refugees exclusively over their join border, because it can not keep pace with such influx. Zagreb is trying to persuade the Belgrade to direct the migrants also to Hungary and Romania. For a short period of time Croatia and Serbia have even closed their border crossing. The migrant crisis is not going to be solved over the night so one could expect more turbulences in relations between this two countries. The same goes to Macedo-nian-Greek relations. Beside that, the recent migrant crisis has spoiled the bileteral relations between the three NATO and EU members too: Slovenia, Hungary and Croatia.

> Having all that in mind, the NATO integration of the potential applicants from the Western Balkans remains very far from certain, even without strong Russian's opposition to it. Besides the *European fatigue*, now we have the *NATO fatigue* concerning the further enlargement policy. It remains questionable what will happened in the area of Western Balkans in the near future?

REMARKS

M. Bieri (2015) The Western Balkans Between Europe and Russia, Center for security studies, No. 170, March 2015, pp. 1-5.

S. Budjakoski, N. Todorovska, S. Hadhkjecska (2015),"Coordinated Security Cooperation in the Western Balkans – Condition for Faster Integration Process", in Y. Sela ed. (2015) Euro Regions, Institute for Political and International Studies, Skopje, pp. 5-17.

J. Bugajski (2004) Cold Peace. Russia's New Imperialism, Praeger, Westport.

L. Čehulić Vukadinović (2014) „Strategic Problems and the Integration of the Western Balkans in NATO", Sovremena Makedonska Odbrana – međunarodno naučno spisanie za odbrana, bezbednost i mir, Vol. XIV, No. 26, pp. 37-48.

L. Čehulić Vukadinović (2012),Western Balkans accession to NATO and EU, Research Paper – Human Rights Conflict Prevention Centre, Vol. XII, No. 1-2, 2012, Bihać pp. 1295-1308.

L. Ćehulić Vukadinović (2010), Euroatlantizam i suvremeni međunarodni odnosi, Politička kultura-CID, Zagreb-Podgorica.

J. Dempsey (2014), *Why Defense Matters. A New Narrative for NATO,* Carnegie Europe, Brussels, June 2014, pp. 4-11.

J. Dempsey (2015), The Balkans Rocky Path to Democracy, Carnegie Europe, April, 20, 2015, available at http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=59830, approached April 24, 2015.

V. Đorđević (2015), Bussiness Deals and Western Fears (Russian challenge in the Western Balkans) availabe at http://www.cepolicy.org/westernbalkans, approached April 25, 2015.

S. Đukić (2009), Vreme energije, Glasnik, Beograd.

M. Fetai (2007), „Macedonia and Crisis Management" in L. Čehulić ed. (2007) Yearbook Šipan 2006, Politicka kultura, Zagreb, pp. 152-167.

M. J. Hassan (2001), „Globalization and Security: Strategies for Cooperation in the 21st Century" in S. Kamarulzaman, S.M. Alatas, eds., (2001) The Impact of Globalization on the Islamic World: Issues and Challenges in the 21st Century, Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, Kuala Lumpur, pp. 181-198.

Simone de Galbert, Migrant Crisis Challenges EU Open Border Policy, http://csis.org/publication/migrant-crisis-challenges-e-open-border-policy, aproached October 1 2015.

D.S. Yost (1998), NATO Transformed. The Alliance's New Role in International Security, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C.

F.S. Larrabee (1994) Western Strategy toward the former Yugoslavia, RAND, Santa Monica.

R. Maxwell, J.A. Olsen (2013), Destinacija NATO. Reforma obrane u Bosni i Hercegovini 2003-2013, RUSI, London.

M. Mitrevska (2013), "Societal Security Needs as a Reason for the Conflict: The case of Macedonia", Sovremena makedonska odbrana, Skopje, 13(25):9-18.

Rebecca R. Moore (2007), NATO's New Mission. Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World, Preager Security International, Westport, Connecticut, London.

A. Muharemi (2012), Turska, Uvod u povijest, unutarnju i vanjsku politiku, Novi Libertas, Zagreb.

R. Nešković (2013) Nedovršena država, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Sarajevo.

D. Petrović (2010), Rusija i Evropa, Institut za međunarodnu politku i privredu, Beograd.

M. Prokopijević (2005), Evropska unija - Uvod, Glasnik, Beograd.

T. Xhaferi (2015) Implementation of the Strategic Commitments of the Republic of Macedonia to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, Institute for Political and International Studies, Skopje.

A. Savić (2010) „NATO u Srbiji – Srbija bez NATO-a" in Srbija i NATO: za i protiv, Akademija za diplomatiju i bezbednost, Beograd, pp. 126-137.

D. Simeunović & A. Dolnik (2013) „Security Threats of Violent Islamic Extremism and Terrorism for South East Europe and Beyond" in S. Cross, S. Kentera, R. Vukadinović (eds.) Shaping South East Europe's Security Community for the Twenty-First Century, Palgrave, Macmillan, Hampshire, pp. 87-113.

J. Simić (2010), U potrazi za novom misijom. NATO i jugoslovenska kriza 1990-2001, Službeni Glasnik, Beograd.

S.R. Sloan (2010), Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama, The Continum International Publishing Group, New York.

S.R. Sloan (2005), NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community.The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, London.

G. Stang (2015), The bear and the beaver: Russia and European energy security, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief Issue, No. 22, July 2015.

M. Tahirović (2010) „NATO" in G. Đurović, ed. (2010), Crna Gora u XXI stoljeću – Integracija u evropske i evroatlantske strukture, Crnogorska akademija nauka i umjetnosti, Podgorica, pp. 222-280.

W.J. Thies (2009),Why NATO Endures, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York.

R. Vukadinović (2008) „Američka politika i stvaranje kosovske države", Međunarodne studije, Vol. 8, No 1, pp. 5-19.

R. Vukadinović (2002), Security in South-Eastern Europe, Politička kultura, Zagreb.

B. Zyla (2011), „Participation in and Cooperation with NATO – Intelligence Reform in Albania", in Stephen R. Di Renzo, D. Crnčec, L. Brožić (2011), Regional Security and Intelligence Cooperation in the Western Balkans and Global Asymmetric Threats, Defensor, Ljubljana, pp. 16-24.

Piszą w numerze:

Lidija Čehulić Vukadinović – profesor stosunków międzynarodowych Uniwersytetu w Zagrzebiu

Dariusz Czajka – dr nauk prawnych, profesor nadzwyczajny i rektor EWSPiA

Andrzej Czupryński – dr hab., wykładowca Akademii Obrony Narodowej

Artur Kotowski – dr nauk prawnych, asystent sędziego Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Karna, radca prawny, prodziekan EWSPiA

Wanda Mende – nadkomisarz w KG Policji, absolwentka EWSPiA

Małgorzata Tyszko-Gasik – studentka EWSPiA

Jerzy J. Wiatr – profesor zwyczajny dr hab. socjologii, rektor honorowy EWSPiA, były minister edukacji narodowej (1996–1997)